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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to assess the possible influence of the 1994 In Trust Agreements (ITAs) 
on acquisition and distribution of germplasm held by the International Research Rice Institute 
(IRRI) genebank. The agreements, legally affirmed the ‘public good’ status of the collections 
that were placed ‘In Trust’ for the benefit of the world community under agreements with FAO. 
They initiated a formal system of multilateral access to CGIAR-held ex situ genetic resources. 
The hypothesis that the consequences of the ITAs lead to an enhancement of CGIAR germplasm 
utilization is tested here using a basic conceptual framework to infer on factors determining 
the distribution of germplasm. Subsequently a Bayesian empirical model is applied to IRRI 
accessions distribution’s time-series to provide formal evidence to the hypothesis. Results show 
that there is a discernible ‘change’ point that would support a significant drop in germplasm 
distribution followed by a new growing trend around the establishment of the ITAs. This had 
followed a period beginning around 1989 and leading up to the establishment of the ITAs of a 
large number of requests for restoration of germplasm back to countries of origin and a reduction 
in acquisitions. As a result the number of accessions held by IRRI reached a low point around 
1994. The number of accessions might not have been built back up without the establishment of a 
stable policy environment that was provided by the ITAs.
Keywords: Crop genetic resources, germplasm collection, search theoretic framework, count data, 
change-points.
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Introduction
The objective of this paper is to test the hypothesis that the 
consequences of the 1994 In-Trust Agreements lead to an 
enhancement of CGIAR germplasm utilization. In doing 
so formal investigations on factors affecting germplasm 
acquisition and distribution are conducted and a theoreti-
cal framework is developed through which it is possible to 
derive the demand of genetic resources (i.e germplasm 
distribution) and explain how it is affected by its factors.
CGIAR germplasm collections were established with 
the intention of compiling genetic material of major staple 
crops in order to make it freely available for breeding. 
Subsequently germplasm availability for research and plant 
improvement to address problems of food security and 
productivity were also ensured. In this context the signifi-
cance of the CGIAR collections is potentially enormous. The 
centres hold approximately 600,000 accessions, out of the 6 
million accessions stored in over 1,300 genebanks around 
the world (FAO’s 1996 State of the World Report on PGRFA). 
With the entry into force of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) (Nairobi final Act) countries could begin 
to exercise their national sovereignty by increasing restric-
tions on access to Plant Genetic Resources (PGR). Therefore 
CGIAR centers would have been compelled to comply 
with international law, if an ad hoc legal framework for 
the CGIAR material would not have been established. This 
means that without the ITAs countries that had contributed 
germplasm to CGIAR collections could demand its return 
or stipulate that CGIAR Centres holding the plant genetic 
resource material must limit its further distribution and 
use. Also countries hosting CGIAR Centre genebanks could 
consider germplasm held in those genebanks to fall under 
their sovereign rights because the material was technically 
located within the borders of that country (Gotor et al., 2008). 
It should be noted however that if on the one hand the real 
risk was that after the CBD some countries may have started 
questioning the distribution of germplasm samples by the 
CGIAR on the other hand, it is not certain that countries 
would have had the capacity to handle the material. Some of 
the donating countries in fact lacked key resources, includ-
ing trained personnel, adequate facilities and appropriate 
legal frameworks to manage or distribute the germplasm 
themselves. Overall it was generally perceived that policy 
uncertainty with respect to CGIAR genetic resources would 
impede the free distribution and acquisition of germplasm, 
including the flows occurring between CGIAR Centres, 
arming thus research on agriculture (Gotor et al., 2008). Even 
if exchanges did not completely decline, confidence in and 
thus funding for CGIAR germplasm collections could have 
collapsed. Such an outcome would have had a distinctly 
negative impact on research and development.
The ‘public good’ status of the collections was legally 
affirmed in 1994, when the germplasm collections were 
placed ‘In Trust’ for the benefit of the world community 
under agreements with FAO. These agreements initiated a 
formal system of multilateral access to CGIAR-held ex situ 
genetic resources. The expected impact of the agreements 
was to maintain flows of germplasm both to and from the 
CGIAR centres. The foundation of the Agreements is that 
CGIAR Centres do not regard themselves as owners, but 
rather trustees for these collections. They managed them on 
behalf of the beneficiaries, in particular developing coun-
tries, and they had the obligation to conserve the material 
to the highest technical standards, to duplicate it for safety 
reasons, to make it available without restrictions, and to 
seek no intellectual property right over it. This last obliga-
tion would include a transfer mechanism to avoid another 
party subsequently making the collections unavailable for 
research and breeding. The guarantee provided by CGIAR 
Centres was to ensure that the recipients of transferred 
germplasm and its related information were bound by 
the same conditions as the Centres themselves—neither 
to claim ownership over the designated germplasm nor to 
seek any intellectual property rights over that germplasm 
or related information. 
In this study an empirical application will be provided, 
in order to give statistical evidence of the In-Trust influence 
on the genetic stocks’ distribution. As described above, 
the main hypothesis to prove statistically is the favorable 
impact of the agreements on the availability and utilization 
of CGIAR material, that given the uncertainty brought by 
the CBD, would have been lost. 
The Chib’s changepoints framework (1998) with 
latent state variable is selected to investigate the hypoth-
esis because it is explicitly formulated to assess count data 
changepoints, and so particularly qualified in estimation 
process without the inclusion of other covariates. The 
estimations are conducted including data on genebanks 
utilizations and acquisitions provided by IRRI genebank. 
This study attempts to add some further empirical evidence 
to the studies conducted by Evenson and Gollin (1997) that 
using production function analysis have evaluated the eco-
nomic role of IRRI in improving rice cultivars in respect to 
the average value of modern rice varieties and by Fowler et 
al. (2001) that examine CGIAR germplasm demand and sub-
sequent use both in developing and developed countries. 
The theoretican model:  
search-theoretic framework.
The search methodology is introduced here as a viable tool 
to identify factors determining the distribution of germ-
plasm. It assigns also a present value to the expected future 
benefits of the research activity. In the search-theoretic frame-
works benefits are compared to costs in order to optimize the 
search activity. In the PGRs case, the value of a single germ-
plasm accession is shown by the product of the probability 
of discovering a valuable trait during the search process 
and its expected yield enhancement effects (Gollin et al., 
2000). The search process however may be time-consuming 
and costly because of the activities required for the trait 
evaluation such as molecular screening or agronomic tests, 
in addition to germplasm acquisition and transaction costs 
(set by Zohrabian et al., 2003, at about 7$ per accession, per a 
single trait). This is an important aspect because often germ-
plasm stored in public genebanks lack detailed information 
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concerning genetic characterization and the likelihood that 
a single accession will be useful. Moreover breeding out-
comes can be quite unpredictable because of the unpredict-
able nature of genotype environment interactions. 
Search-theoretic frameworks attempt to simulate the 
stochastic nature of breeding research and the successes 
and failures that they experience. When the probability of 
failure is non-zero, search can then be conducted in order 
to determine whether particular genetic traits may be 
useful. Evenson and Kislev (1976) gave impetus to several 
studies in valuing genetic stocks through this approach. 
That methodology, which is the first apply search theory to 
genetic resource evaluation, has roots grounded in a classic 
paper by Stigler (1961) who models consumer demand when 
a consumer, facing a price proposition, has uncertainty as 
to whether it is a minimum among possible alternatives. 
It is worth mentioning that this basic idea of Stigler (1961) 
spawned a vast growing literature related to job search, 
unemployment and related macroeconomic phenomena. 
An introduction to search formal analysis is contained in 
Sargent (1987), meanwhile Rogerson et al., (2005), present a 
recent literature survey on the subject. 
The model we propose describes the salient features 
of the search process for the action ‘choose the best of a set of 
possible outcomes from a set of random trials.’ In this context 
we conceptualize the search process as one in which the 
investigator seeks to locate the genetic material that offers 
the maximum likelihood of return of the desired trait, for 
example resistance to a particular disease or elevation of a 
particular productivity measure. Each trial is an agronomic 
test; it involves genetic screening of a single accession that 
the investigator requests from a genebank. 
Let x ≡ (x1, x2, … xN)ʹ denote the vector of quantities (i.e 
resistance score) obtained from N successive accessions 
or searches for a trait. We assume that these quantities 
are random variables emanating from a given probability 
distribution, that the trials are independent of one another, 
and that the draws can therefore, be modelled as iid draws 
from the given density or probability mass measure f(x). If 
N denotes the number of such accessions we can focus our 
attention on N*, which is the optimal number of accessions 
that the investigator should select. The optimum number 
is, of course determined by the relevant objective function 
faced by the investigator. If we let yN ≡ max{x1, x2, …, xN},we 
can consider the selection of the optimal level, N*, as the 
solution to the problem
(1)  max Φ(N;) ≡ E{U[ Benefit(yN) − Cost (yN)]},
                 
N
where U[∙] denotes utility derived from the search process. We 
assume that benefits obtained from locating the maximum 
value among the N accessions is completely described by the 
benefit function Benefit(yN) and also that the costs incurred 
in locating yN are completely described by the cost function 
Cost(yN). Let us suppose that for each successful realization 
of the N trials – each yN – the investigator receives a benefit 
of the amount a > 0, so that the benefit function assumes the 
form Benefit(yN) ≡ a yN. How the quantity a is calculated, 
revealed or determined we are unable to answer at this point. 
In addition, if we assume that each search-and-screening 
exercise incurs a constant per unit cost k > 0, then the cost 
of N such trials – the cost of realizing yN – is Cost(yN) ≡ k N. 
It follows that the utility derived from transacting N acces-
sions is U[∙] ≡ a yN – k N. In order to make further progress 
we note that if we also knew the form of the distribution f(x) 
from which the realizations x1, x2, … xN are drawn, we could 
assess the actual form of the objective function in equation 
(1). Consequently we could proceed to model the demand for 
accessions, namely the optimal value N* that is chosen by the 
investigator. Indeed such an assumption should be supported 
by an appropriate empirical exploration, and the empirics 
to follow provide some indications. In this context, and the 
desire at this point purely to simplify we adopt Stigler’s (1961) 
assumption that the distribution f(x) is uniform, on the stand-
ardized interval [0,1] ¹.
Using this assumption the first-order required condition, 
which is also sufficient for a maximum, is 
(2) Φ(N;a,k) ≡ a(N+1)–aN – k = 0.
                                       (N+1)²
It is trivial to establish that the solution to this equation, 
N*, increases with increasing a and declines when increas-
ing k, as one would expect in a realistic search situation 
with increasing value of the benefits derived and costs 
incurred. Using this simple idea we can motivate changes 
in the demand for accessions—that is, changes in the value 
N*—as a result of changes arising in the perceived costs and 
benefits of sourcing accessions. In this way, we are able to 
motivate changes in the counts data associated with the 
trend of accessions. 
Data used
Prior to considering the results we present a broad over-
view of some of the data made available to us by the IRRI 
genebank. The International Rice GeneBank Collection 
(IRGC) at IRRI comprises the largest collection of rice germ-
plasm held In-Trust for the world community (McNally et 
al., 2006). In fact, out of 109,055 accessions collected world-
wide from 1961 to 2006, 102,899 (94.4%) are In-Trust whereas 
6,156 (5.6%) are non In-Trust. 102,901 accessions belong to 
Asian cultivated rice (Oryza sativa), of which 96,995 (94.2%) 
are In-Trust and 1,656 accessions are African cultivated rice 
(Oryza glaberrima), all of which are kept In-Trust. IRRI main-
tains records of breeding pedigrees of all modern rice varie-
ties derived from mating traditional varieties (McNally et 
al., 2006). As shown in figure 1 the acquisition trend changes 
significantly over time.
Overall, figure 1 shows that accession contributions had 
a wave motion over the years due to different causes. Factors 
affecting germplasm flows in fact could be located in the 
CGIAR genebank, at the level of the country, researcher 
providing or requesting germplasm. For example research 
¹ For full details of our assumptions and calculations see Appendix A.
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funding and collecting strategies within IRRI play an 
important role in germplasm acquisition. According to the 
Head of IRRI Genetic Resources Center the peak of germ-
plasm acquisition during the 1970s shown in figure 1 was 
relating to the availability of high levels of core funding and 
the strategic goal to establish a large and diverse collection. 
The second peak during the late 1990s instead was relating 
to a specific project aimed at “completing” the collection 
by acquiring germplasm from 22 countries (Head of IRRI 
Genetic Resources Center personal comment). The decrease of 
acquisitions in the 80s and 90s was relating to the adoption 
of more directed and efficient acquisition strategy rather 
than a lack of funds or political uncertainty (Head of IRRI 
Genetic Resources Center personal comment). Adding a new 
accession to the collection in fact adds a fixed amount to 
operational costs of conserving regardless of the size of the 
collection, but gives diminishing returns as the size of the 
collection increases. That is, adding a new accession to a 
large collection may add little or no value to the collection 
if it duplicates material already conserved. Therefore, as 
the collection grew IRRI had to be increasingly careful to 
ensure that new accessions added value. 
Studies by Pardey et al. (1999, 2001) and Koo et al. (2003) 
evaluated costs of collecting and conserving accessions. 
The objective was to enact a conservative evaluation of 
marginal accession costs, in order to justify germplasm 
conservation if the costs result to be generally less than 
the potential benefits conferred. Pardey et al. (1999, 2001), 
exploit microeconomic concepts in order to extract marginal 
accession costs, and calculate the amount of the endowment 
necessary to ensure endurable future conservation for the 
genetic materials held by the CIMMYT genebank. The same 
methodology was applied later by Koo et al. (2003), to value 
the resources held by CGIAR genebanks. The investigations 
highlight the insignificance of the costs of holding resources 
compared to the present and future potential benefits that 
are available.
Table 1 shows the 10 countries that contributed the 
most accessions to IRRI, with India, Laos, Indonesia and 
China, accounting for 44% of the total IRRI accessions. 
It is however, interesting to note how the attitude toward 
donations changes pre and post 1994. In fact, India before 
the entry into force of the CBD was a major donor country, 
donating an annual average of 507 samples, this number 
dropped to 2 after 1994. Current Indian policy in fact does 
not allow the usage and conservation of the material con-
served in genebanks outside India. The end result of this is 
that more of India’s rice diversity is likely to be conserved 
in India than in the IRRI genebank. The M.S. Swaminathan 
Research Institute in fact estimates that 100,000 traditional 
varieties are still in use by farmers in India and another 
300,000 have become extinct since agricultural intensifica-
tion (Head of IRRI Genetic Resources Center personal comment). 
IRRI’s collection of about 16,000 traditional and modern 
Indian varieties represents only a fraction of this diversity. 
In Indian trials of varieties suitable for soils damaged by 
the 2006 tsunami, the six most promising varieties were 
all traditional varieties not held within the IRRI collection. 
Moreover, Indian scientists have been continuing to collect 
traditional Indian varieties of rice from all over India. They 
are conserved in the National Bureau of Plant Genetic 
Resources in New Delhi, which now has a much larger and 
more diverse collection of Indian rice than IRRI. On the 
other hand, countries such as Laos, increased distribution 
after 1994 (the IRRI increase of accessions in 1994 shown in 
figure 1 is actually due mostly to Laos), accounting for an 
annual average of 1027 samples given to IRRI. IRRI’s collec-
tion of accessions originating from Laos (of approximately 
15,000 accessions) is considered to be very complete and is a 
large representative of Laos’ diversity. For this reason, Laos 
may have been motivated to continue to be actively engaged 
with the IRRI collection and this engagement is reflected in 
the continued contributions of germplasm. 
The case of India provide evidence on how countries that 
rejected the multilateral system of germplasm exchange, 
did not want to lose their sole proprietary rights to their 
indigenous germplasm resources, denying thus the free 
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Figure 2 shows the trend of germplasm distributed by 
IRRI for different purposes; restoration of germplasm to 
host countries, use within the IRRI research program and a 
broad category that includes all other purposes. Germplasm 
distributed within IRRI presumably would not be affected 
by any political uncertainty about the status of the collection 
since IRRI scientists can use the material freely. The germ-
plasm distributed by the IRRI genebank to IRRI scientists 
showed two peaks in 1991 and 2002. These coincide with 
the arrival of new staff and management at the genebank 
who undertook a series of interviews and seminars that 
might have created knowledge and awareness among IRRI 
scientists about the germplasm, and thus led to an increase 
in demand of germplasm. 
Germplasm distributed for restoration and for other pur-
poses could well have been affected by, among other factors, 
political uncertainty since its free distribution is depending 
upon the legal status attached to the accessions. Special 
attention to the germplasm distributed for restoration, 
which is understood to be germplasm distributed to country 
of origin for restoration purposes is posed here. Figure 2 
shows two peaks of germplasm distributed for restoration in 
the 90s and from 2004 to 2006. The peak years coincide with 
the period of uncertainty brought about by the CBD and 
in 2006 with the introduction of a new Standard Material 
Transfer Agreement (SMTA) that governed procedures 
for germplasm transfers associated with the International 
Treaty. The first peak in figure 2 will be at the centre of our 
attention in order to empirically understand if an actual 
change point in germplasm distribution is coinciding with 
the entry in to force of the CBD has occurred or not and the 
likely implication of the ITAs for germplasm distribution. 
This choice is emphasized further by the results reported 
by Gotor et al. ( 2008) that pointed out that as a result of the 
CBD, “… real possibility of acrimonious international demands 
of returns of some collections…” would have happened, and 
“germplasm exchange would have come to an end [if an agree-
ment would not have been reached] because the International 
Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs) could hardly operate 
outside the international law. 
Table 1: Germplasm acquired by IRRI from top 10 contributing countries (1961-2006)
Country Total Acquired Acquired pre 94* Acquired post 94*
India 16,770 507 2
Laos 15,362 61 1027
Indonesia 9,099 507 2
China 8,105 232 34
Philippines 6,651 133 173
Thailand 6,348 180 32
Bangladesh 6,166 179 21
Cambodia 4,875 56 233
Malaysia 4,269 95 88
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An empirical assessment of the effects  
of the In Trust agreements on IRRI germplasm 
acquisition and distribution
The purpose of this section is to develop more formally 
the notion that the 1994 In-Trust agreements had an impact 
on the flow of genetic resource materials, specifically the 
germplasm distributed for restoration. In this respect, an 
ideal ‘laboratory’ would enable us to determine formally, 
statistically, the complete trajectory and patterns of genetic 
material exchange had the agreements not materialized. 
Unfortunately, such an objective, despite its considerable 
merits, is simply not possible in the current state of science. 
What we do have available are the patterns of exchanges 
both prior to and immediately following the agreements. 
The question upon which we focus our attention is whether, 
given this pattern of stock exchange, the 1994 period 
brought any discernible change in its movement, either in 
the upwards or in the downwards directions. 
This impact, we posit must have been a decidedly favour-
able one. For example, one crucial impact of the In-Trust 
Agreements is lowering transaction costs of germplasm’s 
accessions exchange (Visser et al., 2000). Because the agree-
ments assured a clear legal status to the genetic resources, 
making them ‘freely’ available it removed a degree of uncer-
tainty regarding property rights to the resources that charac-
terized the period immediately following the Convention of 
Biological Diversity’s enactment (1993) lowering therefore the 
bargaining costs (i.e. negotiation of an agreement) which are 
dependent on the legal status. Again this trend is recorded 
in 2006 when a new Standard Material Transfer Agreement 
(SMTA) was introduced. In this scenario we assume that 
thanks to the agreements, the demand for “In Trust” PGR 
should be relatively enhanced, increasing the genetic stocks 
direct-use value (search value), and consequently providing an 
economic improvement of the CGIAR collections’ value. 
In order to assess whether a structural change occurred 
in the demand of germplasm a wide range of models exists; 
change-point models in time series analysis to test for the 
presence of a structural break are widely used. A change-
point framework due to Chib (1998) which is attractive 
because to assess count data change-points it is formulated 
explicitly and so particularly qualified in estimation process 
without the inclusion of other covarieties, other factors 
affecting the germplasm demand, is chosen as a tool of 
analysis. The Chib’s change point formulation was applied 
to the data, as shown below (Chib 1998), on IRRI germplasm 
distributed for restoration. 
The count in year t, yt, is modelled via a Poisson relation:
(3)² f P(yt|ξt) ≡ ξt
yt exp{-ξt}/yt!
The estimation is executed imposing only one change-point 
in the time-series for the distribution of samples for restora-
tion. We focus on this sub-category because according to 
figure 2, it seems to be the time series that is perhaps most 
affected by the ITAs. 
The posterior means for λ1 and λ2 (the poisson param-
eters of the two identified distributions), are respectively 
3275 and 2828. The model performs efficiently, identifying 
as the change-point the period t = 13, occurring at the point 
of intersection of the two probabilities of st corresponding 
to the year 1995 (figure 4). The figure shows the probability 
that the process falls in each of the two states for all years. 
The change-point marks the beginning of a new rising trend 
of the distributed germplasm. Thus, casual empirical evi-
dence, supported by formal analysis seems to suggest that 
a significant change emerged immediately following the 
establishment of the In-Trust agreements in the germplasm 
distributed for restoration to country of origin. 
Figure 3. Posterior marginal densities of λ1 and λ2.
Figure 4. Pr(st=k|Yn), Germplasm demand dataset. 
Source: Author's calculations
² Where: yt denotes the count in the year t and the density of yt is function 
of the parameter ξt. The value of ξt changes at unknown time points, 
Γm={τ1, …, τm}. In a two- change-points model, for example, Γm={τ1,τ2}, ξt 
is subjected to two breaks, one at time τ1 and another at time τ2 such that 
ξt=λ1 for t≤τ1, ξt=λ2 for τ1<t≤τ2 and ξt=λ3 for τ2<t≤n, where τ1>1 and τ2<n. 
The estimation effort is focused on the vector of the parameters λ, and on 
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Of course, attributing such a switch to a single event 
would not reflect the reality of the situation, where many 
issues related to both policy and other factors would affect 
requests for and actual distribution of germplasm. However, 
as Gotor et al. (2008) demonstrated throughout a qualitative 
analysis based on semi-structured interviews to key inform-
ants, the analysis supports the possibility that the ITAs and 
the accompanying political environment would have had a 
significant positive affect on germplasm distribution. 
As a result of the increased demand for germplasm 
material for restoration combined with the overall reduction 
in acquisitions, the actual size of IRRI genebank would have 
diminished considerably posing the likely scenario of not 
having germplasm exchange and even if germplasm col-
lections would not have fully dismantled, surely would not 
have been found anymore (Gotor et al., 2008) . Gradually as 
the policy environment became more stable, the genebank 
was able to build up its holdings to the pre-CBD level. 
However, if the policy environment had not stabilized it is 
possible that the number of accessions would not have been 
able to recover (Gotor et al., 2008).
Conclusions
The In-Trust Agreements, signed in 1994 between FAO and 
12 CGIAR Centres, were the result of a lengthy process 
of protracted negotiations that had the single objective of 
regulating CGIAR germplasm, its acquisition and its distri-
bution. A considerable challenge existed. This challenge was 
to find an agreement that could accommodate the needs of 
a heterogeneous set of key stakeholders. These stakeholders 
involved as many as twelve heterogeneous research centres, 
with distinct boards of trustees, distinct directorships and 
distinct internal infrastructures; and twelve distinct states, 
each with their own idiosyncratic regulations and legal 
infrastructures. The feasible solution that emerged was to 
apply to CGIAR collections the concept of ‘trusteeship.’ The 
key contribution of the In-Trust Agreements is that there was 
an internationally recognized accord for the multilateral 
exchange of PGR, which in turn has prepared the ground 
for further multilateral agreements on PGR.
The ITAs represent one stage of a continuing, dynamic 
process in implementing and adapting the CBD regime to 
the characteristics of the agricultural sector. The reduction 
of transaction costs should be analyzed further within its 
dimension of reducing bargaining costs associated with 
the monitoring and enforcement costs. In fact the adoption 
in 1998 of a Second Joint Statement of FAO and the CGIAR 
Centres on the “Agreement Placing CGIAR Germplasm 
Collections under the Auspices of FAO” includes some 
provisions regarding monitoring and enforcement of the 
terms of the Material Transfer Agreement (MTA). Under 
the Statement, CGIAR centers and FAO agree to share 
responsibilities to monitor compliance with the provisions 
of MTA and to take legal action against possible infringers. 
Finally, the signature of the Agreement under article 15 of 
the International Treaty is of course the last stage reached 
toward this progress but it is still too early to draw any 
conclusion with existing data. 
There is discernible ‘change’ evident in the statistical 
analysis of distribution data from the IRRI rice collection that 
would support a significant drop in germplasm distribution 
followed by a new rising trend around the establishment of 
the ITAs. This had followed a period beginning around 1989 
and leading up to the establishment of the ITAs of a large 
number of requests for restoration of germplasm back to 
countries of origin and a reduction in acquisitions. As a result, 
the number of accessions held by IRRI reached a low point 
around 1994. Without the establishment of the stable policy 
environment that was provided by the In Trust Agreement 
the number of accessions might not have been built up again.
Appendix A
Associated with the probability distribution function f(x) is a 
cumulative distribution function, F(h) = ∫ h–∞  f(x) dx ≡ ℘(x≤h). 
In the case of the unit uniform distribution we have F(h) = 
∫ h0  ¹ dx = h. Using standard derivations the task of locating 
the maximum can be formalized in probabilistic terms in 
a step-wise fashion. The first step is to derive the cdf cor-
responding to the maximum within the sample, which we 
denote FyN(y)=℘[yN≤y]=℘[x1≤y; x2≤y; …; xN≤y]. Now, if the 
screenings are, in fact, independent draws we have FyN(y) = 
∏i ℘[xi≤y] = ∏i Fxi(y). If the draws are made from the same 
distribution – a reasonable assumption – we then have FyN(y) 
= Fx(y)
N. Consequently, the pdf associated with yN, which is 
obtained by differentiating, is fyN(y) = N[Fx(y)]
N-1fx(y). Finally, 
using the fact that the originating distribution fx(∙) is standard 
uniform, we obtain fyN(y) = N y
N-1, which is clearly a function 
of N, as well as y. An explicit solution to the optimization 
problem in equation (1), which now reduces to
(1b) N
max  Φ(N;a,k) ≡  a N yN dy – k N,
where, we note, ymin and ymax are, respectively, the 
minima and maxima available across the support of the 
standard uniform distribution, that is, ymin = 0 and ymax = 1, 
Table 2: Chib change-point results
Parameters Mean Standard 
deviation
Quintiles for each variable
5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Lambda.1 3275 49.1 3196 3247 3275 3314 3356





IMPACT ASSESSMENT DISCUSSION PAPER
8
respectively. Using this fact, the first-order necessary condi-
tion, which is also sufficient for a maximum, is equation (2).
Appendix B
Within each period Chib introduces a latent class predictor, 
‘st’, referred to as the ‘state’ of system at time t, corresponding 
to the m+1 phases in which the samples can be split. This 
latent state variable is formulated in a way to evolve accord-
ing to a discrete-time, discrete-state Markov process with 
the transition probability matrix, ℘, forced so that st either 
remains at the current value or jumps to the next highest 
value. The count in year t, yt, is modelled via a hierarchical 
Poisson relation (3). Specifically, his variable ‘st’ is an integer 
defined on the set of integers {1, 2, …, m+1} corresponding 
to the m+1 possible phases into which the time series can be 
subdivided. Thus a realization st = k signifies that observation 
‘t’ emanates from state ‘k’ of the system. In other words, that 
observation yt evolves from the distribution f(yt|yt-1, qk), where 
yt-1 ≡ (y1, y2, …, yt-1)́  denotes observations up to time t-1 and qk 
denotes the parameters determining state k of the system. The 
variable is modelled as a discrete-time, discrete-state Markov 
process with the transition probability matrix constrained so 
that the model is equivalent to the change-point model. In 
this context, the transition probability matrix formalizes the 
notion that st can either remain at the current value or jump 
to the next highest value. Thus, the one-step-ahead transition 
probability matrix is represented as
  p11   p12
         p22   p23
(4) ℘ =      ,
  pmm   pm,m+1
    1 
where pij = Prob(st = j|st-1 = i) denotes the probability of 
moving to regime j at time t given that the regime at time 
t-1 resides in regime i. Now, defining S ≡ (s1, s2, …, sN)ʹ as the 
unknown or latent class of states; and defining q ≡ {q1, q2, 
…, qm+1}, attentions focus on the posterior defined over the 
quantities q, ℘ and S. Chib (1998) then derives the general 
forms of the conditional distributions for ℘ and S and notes 
that the distributions corresponding to q are model-specific. 
The state probabilities have a Bernoulli distribution with 
mass-points derived form the complete-data likelihood; 
and the non-zero components of ℘, above, have a Beta 
distribution.
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